The fence at the heart
of Palestine
Israel wants to do more than keep the suicide bombers out, writes
Ilan Pappe. It wants to erase the Palestinian nation once and for
all
In the middle of last month, Israel began building a fence
to separate itself physically from the West Bank. Among my friends on
the Israeli left, there are those who received this news with great
enthusiasm. These are the same friends who were convinced that the Oslo
process would inevitably lead to a lasting and comprehensive peace. Now,
they are rejoicing again, because they believe that this separation is
the first step that will ultimately lead to the creation of an
independent Palestinian state. In their eyes, the fence will serve as
demarcation of the future border between Israel and Palestine.
If they are right, and
the planned fence is indeed meant to delineate these boundaries, then
Palestine -- the geopolitical entity for which the PLO had been
struggling ever since its inception -- is probably lost. For in that
case, the fence will virtually complete the process which was begun by
the Zionist movement in 1882, and has been continued vigorously by
Israel since 1948 -- the process of de-Arabising the land of Palestine.
So far, the process has
been advanced by settlement, expropriation and expulsion. The putative
Palestinian state was already reduced to a ridiculously small patch of
land by the Oslo Accord. Through Oslo, many new and strange conceptions
of statehood first emerged into international discourse. One of these
was the concept of a state composed of two parts which have no
geographical continuity, each of which is itself bisected and bifurcated
into cantons deprived of any territorial integrity.
Alas, my friends'
optimistic interpretation of the fence is utterly wrong, just as their
interpretation of Oslo as a genuine peace process was wrong before it.
Far from heralding the arrival of a new chapter in the history of
Palestine, the erection of the fence is simply the continuation of an
old policy through new means. This policy is that of erasing Palestine
as a geographical, political and cultural entity from the map. In this
article, I want to situate the proposed fence in its context -- not just
in relation to Sharon's policies and objectives, but also as part of a
wider historical process which began in the late 19th century.
The fence has been
widely welcomed in Israel. The only people who oppose it are a few
extremist settlers. For most Jews in Israel, what attracts them to the
fence is not the idea that it defines some final border, but rather its
potential to act as a security device and thus put an end to attacks by
Palestinian suicide bombers. However, the politicians (mainly Labour)
who first conceived the idea some six months ago see things rather
differently. For them, the fence's role is strategic, not simply
tactical.
The two main contenders
for the chairmanship of the Labour Party, Haim Ramon and Benyamin Ben-Eliezer,
have described the fence as a 'peace plan', not just a means to prevent
infiltration. This should come as no surprise. The Labour Party has
always sought a peace which would be based on a dividing line. Indeed,
this was their main slogan in the 1992 general elections: 'We are here
and they are there'. For Labour, the Zionist dream can only be fulfilled
through total separation between Palestinians and Jews. The question of
what exactly may happen on the other (Palestinian) side of the fence
never seems to bother these peace visionaries. They are not interested
in the economic viability of life on the other side, or in how it will
manage its natural and water resources (most of which Labour intends to
keep on the Israeli side of the divide), nor what its sovereignty will
amount to (which Labour in any case does not intend should be full or
complete, since Labour's 'Palestine' would incorporate many
extra-territorial blocs of Jewish settlements), nor even how it will
achieve security (since security is meant to remain exclusively in
Israeli hands).
Not to mention the even
more intricate question of what such a division might mean for the one
million Palestinians inside Israel. Are they 'We', or are they 'They'?
One thing is clear
though about this vision: it is quite compatible with Sharon's basic
approach to 'solving' the Palestine question. Of course, Sharon
originally intended to do it without a fence. But he has been reconciled
to the fence, for the sake of national unity. After all, the Labour
Party is proposing that he build a fence which will cut the West Bank's
present 5000 square kilometres in two, leaving 2500 of them in Israel's
hands. Why should Mr Sharon refuse?
The fence may be part
of an age-old scheme, but the decision to promote the idea at this
precise point in time is the consequence of the Israeli population's
despair at their government's inability to ensure their personal
security ever since the eruption of the Intifadat Al-Aqsa.
This is not the first
time Sharon has exploited temporary fears, the better to implement his
long-term plans. In the summer of 1982, as the PLO's war of resistance
reached a new level of intensity, including the launching of Qatusha
missiles into Israel, he enlisted the Israeli settlers along the
northern border with Lebanon to support the invasion of their northern
neighbour. Then, not only did Sharon fail to achieve his tactical
objective -- the end of violence -- but he succeeded in provoking far
worse forms of violence. Today, the fence will inevitably produce the
same result: more violence against Israel -- and, of course, as always,
more violence against the Palestinians.
As in 1982, so now,
there is an alternative. On the eve of Lebanon's invasion, the PLO
offered a way out, proposing a cease-fire and an armistice. But Sharon
had other plans. Violating the de facto cease-fire, he sent the
Israeli army to invade Lebanon, so as to install a government of his
liking in Beirut and destroy the PLO's infrastructure there. This time
round, the fence around the West Bank is Sharon's ploy to undermine the
opportunity opened up by the Saudi peace plan, which was endorsed by
both the Palestinians and the Arab League.
The peace track has the
potential to offer lasting security to both Israelis and Palestinians.
But in a secure world, generals like Sharon do not thrive, and indeed,
may not even survive.
Sharon's approach to
both Lebanon and the fence are a reflection of a global Zionist- Israeli
vision of imposing a settlement on the conflict by force, thus erasing
the concept of 'Palestine' from both memory and reality, and
substituting for it the name of its rival, Eretz Israel. This Eretz
Israel contains the regions of Judea and Samaria. These areas may be
home to a considerable number of 'Arabs', but these Arabs will have no
power to determine either the name of the country or its character. In
due course, they may well be expelled, when the time is ripe.
Palestine the country
was scratched out of the Zionist consciousness very early on; in fact,
from the moment the first wave of Jewish immigrants arrived on the land
in 1882. As long as the Jewish community in Palestine was a minority,
living under the auspices of the British mandate, Palestine's effacement
remained symbolic, for there was as yet no military power which might
eliminate it physically on the ground. But it was already totally
excluded from the Zionist settlers' discourse and narrative.
When the opportunity
came to translate that vision into reality in 1948, Palestine was erased
not only in word, but by the sword as well. The UN partition resolution
gave the Zionist movement 56 per cent of Palestine; the 1948 war allowed
them to occupy 88 per cent of the country. To all intents and purposes,
it seemed that Palestine as a geo-political and cultural entity had been
destroyed.
But Palestine would not
die. It lived on in the refugee camps, in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, as well as among the Palestinian minority in Israel itself. It
survived the 1967 War and the passing of 100 per cent of historical
Palestine under Israeli control. During the first decade of the
occupation, the Labour government hoped that Palestine would finally be
expunged from regional and global consciousness when they proposed
fusing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with Jordan. But all their
efforts were to no avail.
And then in 1977 the
Likud rose to power, bearing with it the Greater Israel ideology. Now,
the concept of 'Palestine' was to be drowned beneath the massive waves
of Jewish settlement that flooded into the occupied territories, blocked
out by the adamant refusal to even discuss the future of the refugees,
and silenced by the insistence that the Palestinians within Israel were
not a national group, but rather religious communities -- Christians and
Muslims -- who had no right to self- determination or collective
national identity.
But this strategy too
failed, and in 1987 the first Intifada broke out. The uprising forced
the Israelis, for the first time since 1948, to consider Palestine as a
possible political entity, which might take the form of an independent
state alongside Israel, to be established in the occupied territories.
Or at least, this was the principle to which they agreed in the Oslo
Accord. In retrospect, it would seem that the Israeli government never
had any intention of creating a Palestinian state on 22 per cent of
historical Palestine. At the same time, it would seem that the PLO,
which had by now evolved into the Palestinian Authority, did in fact
make the most significant concession ever granted by the Palestinian
side, when it consented to make do with a miniature Palestinian stateley
as the geopolitical realisation of its vision of liberation.
But even that limited
wish was not to be granted. Micro-Palestine was no sooner born, than it
was dissected into areas A, B, and C, and the Gaza Strip was cordoned
off and encircled by an electric fence, as if it were one huge prison.
The result was to leave much of 'Palestine' -- 42 per cent of the West
Bank and about 20 per cent of the Gaza Strip -- under direct or indirect
Israeli occupation. This was the situation throughout the 'peace
process'. And yet the Israelis and Americans still cannot understand why
the Palestinians did not learn to put their faith in diplomacy and
negotiation as the best way to fulfil their dreams of self-determination
and independence! (At least the Europeans seem to be slightly more
clear- sighted in these matters.)
President Arafat was
presented with this fait accompli at Camp David in the summer of
2000, where he was told to simply 'take it or leave it'. Shortly
afterwards, the second Intifada broke out.
This unarmed uprising
was turned into an armed revolt by harsh Israeli retaliation to
demonstrations and street protests. Gradually, micro-Palestine was
reoccupied. Yet whether under direct or indirect rule, conditions for
the occupied population were equally dismal. They found themselves
unemployed, starved and strangled, unable to move or properly make a
living. It is this situation which produced the suicide bombers. We
should not be surprised when people such as Cherie Blair, the wife of
the British prime minister, recognise this fact. To many people, the
genesis of these attacks is perfectly obvious. Reprehensible as they may
be when the targets are innocent civilians, they are the direct product
of despair. This fact was recognised also in a recent petition signed by
Palestinian intellectuals, which both condemned the attacks, and
explained the context which made them possible.
The Israelis have used
all possible means to try and crush what they call the 'terror
infrastructure' -- as if F-16s, tanks and commando units could instil
much fear into young Palestinian men and women who are willing to turn
themselves into fireballs in the midst of a crowded Jerusalem street.
The human loss on the Israeli side has reached catastrophic proportions,
in relation to the country's history and population; tragedies that are
amplified by the fact that, in some cases, entire families perish in
such attacks. The almost incomprehensible cowardice of the Israeli press
-- and particularly the audiovisual media -- protects Jewish society
from any real knowledge of the context which has produced these personal
calamities. There is no mention of the occupation, the humiliations and
assassinations, the mass arrests, the destruction of houses and the
starvation, which together have bred these suicide attacks. With the
public mind so carefully and meticulously closed, it is little wonder
that the fence has been accepted unconditionally by most Israelis, for
whom it has the power of a magic formula.
Yet even an amateur can
see that the fence will hardly pose any obstacle to future suicide
bombers. Instead, it will serve the past and present ideological
ambition of Israel to wipe out Palestine one time for all. After all,
the total disappearance of one's enemy is a far more 'convenient'
solution than compromise, reconciliation or accountability for the past.
With the help of this fence (in actual fact, a wall), Sharon is defining
what Palestine will be for future generations: half the West Bank,
bisected into isolated cantons, and an island consisting of 75 per cent
of the Gaza Strip. In these areas, Palestinians will be able to run
their own municipal affairs, though only just; they will even be allowed
to call these fragments a 'State'. To judge by President Bush's
statement of 24 June 2002, America's current vision of a solution to the
Palestine problem coincides exactly with that of the Israeli regime. Yet
it is within this straight jacket that President Bush expects democracy,
transparency and economic prosperity to flourish! This cynicism can only
sour American- Palestinian relations further, and may in a more distant
future substantially harm the US's status throughout the Arab world. For
Bush will now be perceived as the facilitator of Israel's attempt to
wipe Palestine out of existence.
The fence, or rather
wall, is also likely to work against Israel's interests in a number of
ways. Just as in the case of the Israeli siege of the Muqata'a, where
the Israelis isolated Arafat, only to find themselves in their turn
ostracised by most of the rest of the world, so here too the
consequences may be the contrary of those expected. For the wall
encircles Israel just as much as it cordons off Palestine. Stretching
along Israel's longest border, the Eastern front, such a wall can only
increase the country's already overwhelming sense of isolation, and
reinforce the siege mentality from which Israelis have suffered for so
many years, and which has fed support for the intransigent and
aggressive policies of their governments.
But of course, whatever
it may do to Israel, the fence is far more destructive for the
Palestinians who are under occupation. It is hard to talk of
deterioration in their conditions, when those conditions are already so
grim and so inhuman; but unfortunately, however bad things are, they can
always be made worse.
So. will the
international community listen to the wise words of Cherie Blair,
Desmond Tutu, Jose Saramago, Oliver Stone, Ted Turner, and many others,
who have understood what is happening and warned against the impending
calamity -- at the risk of being immediately branded anti-Semites, if
not neo- Nazis? Or will they remain silent, as they have for so many
years, in the face of yet another attempt to erase Palestine -- just as
CNN has succumbed to Israeli pressure and abandoned its previously
balanced coverage of the conflict? (The Israeli minister of
communication is now trying to remove the BBC World Service from the
Israeli satellite and cable networks, as punishment for its 'biased'
coverage. One can only hope the BBC will not give in as CNN did).
Since President Bush's
latest statement on the Palestine issue essentially gave a green light
to the Israelis to do whatever they wished until the congressional
elections in the autumn of 2002, it seems likely that the voices of
wisdom will have to continue crying in the wilderness for some time yet.
Not so long ago, Palestine stretched from the Mediterranean to the
Jordan. Now, its indigenous Arab population is going to be fenced into
an area that represents less than 15 per cent of their country's
original size.
Where are Europe and
the Arab world, while all this is happening? Where are the Asian and
African nations? One can understand why Germany hesitates to take a
clear stand on the issue, although it is high time that it learned the
moral lesson of its own past conduct -- its moral obligation for the
Holocaust should place it in the vanguard of those nations which oppose
crimes against humanity, occupation and abuses of human rights, even if
the crimes are committed by those whose parents and grandparents were
the victims of that very same Holocaust. But what about the other member
states of the EU and the UN? As I have warned before, by the time they
all wake up, it may be too late. Too late not only for the Palestinians,
but also for the Israelis, who will certainly find it even more
difficult to be accepted -- or even simply to survive -- in the Middle
East, after a second Nakbah of their making. |